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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution1 and the Minnesota State 
Constitution2 prohibit the deprivation of life, liberty, or property at 
the hands of the government without due process of law.  While a 
license to drive is not a right, the United States Supreme Court and 
the Minnesota Supreme Court have concluded that “[a] license to 
drive is an important property interest.”3  “Once licenses are issued 
. . . their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit 
of a livelihood . . . .  In such cases the licenses are not to be taken 
away without that procedural due process required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”4  In Minnesota, drivers who either refuse 
to submit to a test of their alcohol content or who test over the 
limit5 have their driver’s licenses revoked by the peace officer who 
handled their arrest.6  This process, known as a pre-hearing 
revocation, allows for this revocation without any finding by a court 
of law.  The law allowing this practice is the implied consent law.7 
This analysis of the constitutionality of Minnesota’s pre-
hearing revocation scheme begins by explaining the mechanics of 
Minnesota’s implied consent statute.8  Because the United States 
Supreme Court has established minimum procedural due process 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 2. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 3. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). 
 4. Id. 
 5. “It is a crime for any person to drive . . . any motor vehicle . . . when the 
person’s [blood alcohol content] is .10 or more.” MINN. STAT. § 169A.20 subd. 1(5) 
(2004).  In August of 2005 the limit will be lowered to .08.  2004 Minn. Laws 283. 
 6. MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subd. 3 (2004). 
 7. Id. § 169A.51. 
 8. Infra part II. 
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protections that must be afforded drivers, this backdrop is 
examined.9  After considering the federal standards for procedural 
due process, the numerous changes to Minnesota’s implied 
consent statute will be addressed.10  Next, the current challenge will 
be discussed, including the factual basis for the challenge, the 
arguments for the statute’s unconstitutionality, and the district 
court’s decision.11  Finally, this note will conclude that, given the 
dramatic increase in the private interest at stake and the complete 
lack of any procedural due process protections, Minnesota’s 
current pre-hearing revocation scheme is unconstitutional.12 
 
II. THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW 
 
A. Language of Implied Consent 
 
Drivers arrested for drunk driving are subject to two separate 
penalty schemes.  There are criminal penalties associated with 
“driving while impaired” (DWI).13  The DWI laws make it illegal per 
se to operate a motor vehicle if a person has an alcohol 
concentration at or above a particular level.14  Alcohol 
concentration can be measured by a breath test,15 urine test,16 or 
blood test.17  In addition to criminal penalties, a driver arrested for 
drunk driving is subject to the penalties provided for in the implied 
consent statute.  The implied consent statute is civil in nature, and 
therefore imposes a separate and distinct set of penalties or 
consequences upon the driver.18  Because there are two systems, the 
driver is subject to two proceedings; the implied consent 
proceeding only deals with the civil penalty, the revocation of the 
 
 9. Infra part III. 
 10. Infra part IV. 
 11. Infra part V. 
 12. Infra part VI. 
 13. MINN. STAT. § 169A.01 (2004). 
 14. Id. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5). 
 15. Id. § 169A.51, subd. 3.  When a breath test is used, the measure is “the 
number of grams per 210 liters of breath.”  Id. § 169A.03, subd, 2(2). 
 16. Id. § 169A.51, subd. 3.  In a urine test, “’[a]lcohol concentration’ means   
. . . the number of grams of alcohol per 67 milliliters . . . .”  Id. § 169A.03, subd. 
2(3). 
 17. Id. § 169A.51, subd. 3.  “‘Alcohol concentration’ means the number of 
grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.”  Id. § 169A.03, subd. 2(1). 
 18. DONALD H. NICHOLS, THE DRINKING DRIVER IN MINNESOTA § 3.01 (5th ed. 
2004). 
3
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driver’s license.19  While these criminal and civil systems have 
become intertwined, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that 
the significant civil implied consent penalties “[do] not render the 
implied consent law punitive.”20 
Drunk driving statutes, both civil and criminal, use specialized 
terms.  These terms vary between the states.  Minnesota has a civil 
system based on implied consent.21  “Implied consent” technically 
refers to the consent that every driver of a motor vehicle gives to 
the state to be tested for alcohol or controlled or hazardous 
substances in exchange for being granted a license to operate a 
motor vehicle.22  The term “implied consent” is used by 
practitioners when referring to Minnesota’s administrative license 
revocation process.23  To avoid confusion, Minnesota’s 
administrative license revocation scheme will be referred to as 
“implied consent.”  A revocation under that scheme will be 
referred to as an “administrative revocation.” 
B. Purpose of Implied Consent 
The purpose of implied consent laws is to reduce the 
incidence of drunk driving and the corresponding threat thereby 
caused to public safety.  According to the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA), administrative license revocation 
laws serve two purposes.24  First, they allow for swift revocation of 
the driver’s license.25  Second, they are a “successful deterrent.”26  
“Studies have indicated that administrative per se license 
suspension is . . . perceived by drivers as having the highest severity, 
certainty, and swiftness of all DUI sanctions, including jail and 
fines, thereby increasing the deterrence.”27  The deterrent effect is 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. (citing Davis v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 517 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. 1993)).  
The Davis court specifically considered the amount of the license revocation fee, 
which was $250.00 in 1993.  Id.  The current license revocation fee is $680.00.  In 
addition, the civil penalty can now be used to enhance criminal offenses.  See 
discussion infra parts IV.B., V.B.2.b. 
 21. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subd. 1 (2004). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Administrative License Revocation, 2 TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 1 (Mar. 2004), 
available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/new-Fact-Sheet03/fact-
sheet04/laws-ALR.pdf (last visited on April 14, 2005). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Kerry G. Wangberg, Administrative Driver’s License Suspension, ARIZ. LAWYER, 
4
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linked to the publicity of the law, so that drivers know and 
understand the consequences of their actions.28  As of December 
2003, forty-one states had “some form of administrative license 
revocation.”29 
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) rates every state on 
various factors surrounding its DWI laws.30  One of the nine factors 
considered is “administrative measures.”31  According to MADD, 
“[r]esearch and experience have shown that a system of 
progressively severe administrative penalties . . . deters individuals 
from driving after drinking and affect repeat offenders.”32  These 
administrative penalties include administrative license revocation, 
“which protects the public by removing offenders from the 
highways as quickly as possible.”33  In Minnesota, after drivers have 
had their licenses administratively revoked, they receive a seven-day 
temporary permit to “get their affairs in order.”34  Accordingly, a 
driver who qualifies for an administrative revocation is not 
immediately “off the streets.”  In 2002, MADD gave Minnesota an 
overall grade of B- in its report.35  Minnesota’s grade for 
administrative measures, however, was a B+.36  Minnesota’s implied 
consent law is listed as a strength.37  According to MADD, the 
 
Dec. 1988, at 29. 
 28. Administrative License Revocation, supra note 23, at 2. 
 29. Id.  These states include Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  Id. 
 30. MADD, Rating the States (2002), at http://www.madd.org/docs/rts2002/ 
rts section1.pdf (last visited on April 14, 2005). 
 31. Id.  The other factors are 1) state political leadership; 2) alcohol content 
testing; 3) state law enforcement programs; 4) underage drinking and drinking 
and driving control; 5) victim’s issues; 6) criminal justice system; 7) resource 
allocation; and 8) innovative state programs.  Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  Other administrative measures include a .08 blood alcohol content 
limit, vehicle sanctions, mandatory assessment, primary seat belt laws, and lower 
alcohol limits for convicted offenders.  Id.  Vehicle sanctions include “alcohol 
ignition interlock devices, impoundment, confiscation, and forfeiture.”  Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.  Other administrative strengths include: license plate confiscations, 
vehicle impoundment/immobilizations, vehicle confiscation/forfeiture, and the 
fact that refusing an alcohol content test is a crime.  Id. 
5
Sheridan and Booth: Revoke First, Ask Questions Later: Challenging Minnesota’s Uncons
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
SHERIDANBURKHART BOOTH.DOC 4/17/2005  2:27:10 PM 
1466 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:4 
implied consent law is strong because a “[r]equest for [an 
administrative license revocation] hearing does not delay license 
suspension.”38  In addition, an administrative suspension counts as 
a prior DWI offense.39 
 
C. Implied Consent Procedure 
 
1. Authorization for the Test 
 
Every driver who operates a motor vehicle40 in Minnesota 
consents to testing for “determining the presence of alcohol, 
controlled substances, or hazardous substances.”41  There are three 
means of testing: blood, breath, or urine.42  A peace officer can 
require a driver to take such a test if two criteria are met.  First, the 
peace officer must have “probable cause to believe the person was 
driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle” while 
impaired.43  Second, one of the following four factors must be 
present: (1) a lawful arrest for driving while impaired;44 (2) an 
accident that caused death, personal injury, or property damage;45 
(3) a refusal of a preliminary screening test;46 or (4) the 
preliminary screening test yielded a result above 0.10.47 
When a peace officer gives an implied consent test, she must 
inform the driver that Minnesota law requires submission to the 
test.48  The peace officer must explain why Minnesota requires the 
test.49  The peace officer must tell the driver that refusal to take the 
test is a crime.50  The peace officer must inform the driver that if 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. “‘Motor Vehicle’ means every vehicle that is self-propelled and every 
vehicle that is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires.  
The term includes motorboats in operation and off-road recreational vehicles, but 
does not include a vehicle moved solely by human power.”  MINN. STAT. § 169A.03, 
subd. 15 (2004).  This article will focus on automobiles. 
 41. Id. § 169A.51, subd. 1(a). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id., subd. 1(b). 
 44. Id., subd. 1(b)(1). 
 45. Id., subd. 1(b)(2). 
 46. Id., subd. 1(b)(3). 
 47. Id., subd. 1(b)(4) (to be amended 2005).  On August 1, 2005, the limit 
will decrease to 0.08.  Id. 
 48. Id., subd. 2(1). 
 49. Id., subd. 2(1)(i)–(iii); see infra part II.A. 
 50. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subd. 2(2) (2004). 
6
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she has probable cause to believe that “the criminal vehicular 
homicide and injury laws” have been violated, “a test will be taken 
with or without the person’s consent.”51  Finally, the peace officer 
must tell the driver that she has a limited time to contact an 
attorney before making the decision about testing.52 
The peace officer decides which type of test is used.53  
However, if the driver refuses to take a blood or urine test, that 
person must be offered an alternative test.54  If a driver passes the 
breath test, a blood or urine test can be required “if there is 
probable cause to believe that: (1) there is impairment by a 
controlled substance or hazardous substance that is not subject to 
testing by a breath test; or (2) a controlled substance listed in 
schedule I or II . . . is present . . . .”55  If a person is “incapable of 
refusal,” a test may be given.56 
2. Administration of the Test 
The preferred method of testing is breath testing.57  When a 
peace officer brings a suspected drunk driver in for a breath test, 
she must follow a very specific procedure.58  The driver must be 
observed for at least fifteen minutes before she is given the test.59  
This observation ensures that any alcohol stored in the mouth and 
nasal passages dissipates.60  After the observation period is 
completed, the peace officer performs the breath test.61 
The statute requires the use of an “approved breath-testing 
instrument.”62  Minnesota uses the Intoxilyzer Model 5000.63  “The 
 
 51. Id., subd. 2(3). 
 52. Id., subd. 2(4).  The “right is limited to the extent that it cannot 
unreasonably delay administration of the test.”  Id. 
 53. Id., subd. 3 (to be amended 2005). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id., subd. 6. 
 57. The peace officer can decide to use a blood or urine test instead.  Id. at 
subd. 3.  If the driver refuses a blood or urine test, they must be offered an 
alternative test.  Id. 
 58. NICHOLS, supra note 18, § 9.06. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  “The lining of the mouth and nasal passages stores alcohol for some 
time after a person consumes alcohol.  Normal processes eliminate residual mouth 
alcohol within fifteen minutes.”  Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subd. 5 (2004).  The instrument must be “an 
infrared or other approved breath-testing instrument . . . .”  Id. at subd. 5(a).  The 
test must consist of three parts: “one adequate breath-sample analysis, one control 
7
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Intoxilyzer Model 5000 is . . . considered to be the state-of-the-art 
means to measure breath samples.”64  Before administering the test, 
the peace officer inserts “a new mouthpiece into the breath tube.”65  
After starting the Intoxilyzer, “the subject has four (4) minutes to 
deliver an adequate breath sample.”66  The driver is then instructed 
“to take a deep breath and exhale into the mouthpiece of the 
instrument.”67  A tone sounds when the driver blows into the 
instrument; the driver is instructed to continue blowing until the 
tone stops.68  “The instrument checks minimum flow rate, sample 
volume, and level slope of the sample.  To meet these criteria, it 
may be necessary to have the driver continue to blow for about 
seven seconds.”69  If the driver does not provide an adequate 
sample within four minutes of the start of the test, a message stating 
“insufficient sample” will appear on the instrument.70  Providing an 
insufficient sample is considered refusal.71 
3. Penalties for Test Failure or Refusal 
The penalties for refusing to take or failing an implied consent 
test are severe.72  If the driver refuses to take the test, but the peace 
officer has probable cause to believe the driver was involved in a 
vehicular homicide, “a test may be required and obtained despite 
the person’s refusal.”73 
If a driver refuses to take an implied consent test and the 
peace officer certifies “that there existed probable cause to believe 
the person had been driving, operating, or in physical control of a 
 
analysis, and a second, adequate breath-sample analysis.”  Id. 
 63. Nichols, supra note 18, § 9.01. 
 64. Id. § 9.05. 
 65. OPERATOR’S MANUAL, INTOXILYZER 5000 3–4 (1999). 
 66. Nichols, supra note 18, § 9.02. 
 67. OPERATOR’S MANUAL, INTOXILYZER 5000 3–4 (1999). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subd. 5; Anderson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 441 
N.W.2d 126, 128 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 72. Test failure includes: (1) “an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more; (2) 
an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more, if the person was driving, operating, or 
in physical control of a commercial motor vehicle at the time of the violation; or 
(3) the presence of a controlled substance listed in schedule I or II, other than 
marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols.”  MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subd. 2 (2004).  
Effective August 1, 2005, an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more will constitute 
test failure.  Id. 
 73. Id., subd. 1. 
8
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motor vehicle . . .” while impaired, the individual’s driver’s license 
will be revoked for one year.74  The revocation period for a test 
failure varies based on several factors.75  The base revocation, for 
drivers with no prior incidents and no enhancing factors, is ninety 
days.76  If the driver is under twenty-one years old, their license is 
revoked for six months.77  If the driver has a “qualified prior 
impaired driving incident” in the previous ten years, the revocation 
period is 180 days.78  Finally, if the driver’s alcohol content is 0.20 
or greater, each revocation period is doubled.79 
When a driver refuses to take an alcohol content test or fails 
the test, the peace officer has the authorization to immediately 
revoke the individual’s driver’s license.80  After revocation, drivers 
are issued a seven-day temporary license to “get their affairs in 
order.”81  If it is the driver’s first offense, the driver may request a 
limited license (work permit) after fifteen days.82 
4. Review Options and Procedures 
A driver may challenge her revocation in two ways.  First, a 
driver can request an administrative review.83  Second, the driver 
can request judicial review.84  The request for an administrative 
review “has no effect upon the availability of judicial review . . . .”85  
An administrative review can be requested at any time during the 
revocation period.86  After an administrative review has been 
requested, the commissioner has fifteen days to respond in 
 
 74. Id., subd. 3(a). 
 75. Id., subd. 4(a). 
 76. Id., subd. 4(a)(1). 
 77. Id., subd. 4(a)(2). 
 78. Id. at subd. 4(a)(3).  A “‘[q]ualified prior impaired driving incident’ 
includes prior impaired driving convictions and prior impaired driving-related 
losses of license.”  Id. § 169A.03, subd. 22. 
 79. Id., subd. 4(a)(4).  For example, if a driver who was under twenty-one had 
a blood alcohol content of 0.20 or more, their revocation period would be one 
year.  See id., subd. 4.  A driver with no ‘qualified prior impaired driving incidents’ 
within the past ten years who tested above a 0.20 would have their license revoked 
for 180 days.  See id. 
 80. Id., subds. 6, 7; see infra part II.B. 
 81. MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subd. 6(c)(2), 7(c)(2) (2004). 
 82. Id. § 171.30. 
 83. Id. § 169A.53, subd. 1(a). 
 84. Id., subd. 2. 
 85. Id., subd. 1(b). 
 86. Id., subd. 1(a). 
9
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A request for judicial review must be made within thirty days of 
the driver receiving “a notice and order of revocation or 
disqualification . . . .”88  This time limit is jurisdictional; if the 
request is not served and filed within thirty days, the court cannot 
hear the petition.89  The commissioner does not have to respond to 
the petition and is not charged court fees.90 
According to the implied consent statute, judicial reviews are 
limited to ten issues: (1) “did the peace officer have probable cause 
to believe the person was driving . . . a motor vehicle . . . in 
violation of section 169A.20 . . . ?”; (2) was the driver legally placed 
under arrest for the violation?; (3) was there an accident causing 
property damage or physical injury, including death?; (4) did the 
driver refuse the preliminary breath test?; (5) were the alcohol 
concentration test results over the limit (0.10)?; (6) was the driver 
informed of their rights and consequences of “taking or refusing 
the test . . . ?”; (7) did the driver refuse to take the alcohol 
concentration test?; (8) did the results of the alcohol concentration 
test show an alcohol concentration over 0.10 or “the presence of a 
controlled substance listed in schedule I or II . . . ?”; (9) if a 
commercial vehicle was involved, were the results of the alcohol 
concentration test over 0.04?; and (10) “[w]as the testing method 
used valid and reliable and were the test results accurately 
evaluated?”91  After the judicial review, the court must either sustain 
or rescind the revocation.92  The decision of the judge may be 
appealed through the rules of appellate procedure.93 
An implied consent revocation qualifies as a prior impaired 
driving incident.94  When calculating civil and criminal penalties for 
DWIs, a qualified prior impaired driving incident within the past 
ten years is an aggravating factor.95  Accordingly, an implied 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id., subd. 2(a). 
 89. See, e.g., Plocher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 681 N.W.2d 698, 701 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2004) (citing McShane v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 377 N.W.2d 479, 481 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) rev. denied Jan. 23, 1986) (stating that “[t]imely filing is a 
jurisdictional requirement.”). 
 90. MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subd. 2(a) (2004). 
 91. Id., subd. 3(b). 
 92. Id., subd. 3(e). 
 93. Id., subd. 3(f). 
 94. Id. § 169A.03, subd. 22. 
 95. See id. § 169A.20–.275. 
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss4/5
SHERIDANBURKHART BOOTH.DOC 4/17/2005  2:27:10 PM 
2005] REVOKE FIRST, ASK QUESTIONS LATER 1471 
consent revocation can be used to enhance the criminal penalties 
for subsequent DWIs. 
In 2001, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that judicial 
review of an implied consent revocation will collaterally estop the 
state from relitigating any issue decided against it in the implied 
consent hearing.96  The court held that collateral estoppel applied 
when three facts were present: (1) the issues are identical; (2) there 
is a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the parties are in privity.97  
The issues in an implied consent hearing and the criminal case are 
necessarily identical.98  In addition, the judge at the implied 
consent hearing issues a final judgment on the merits.99  Finally, the 
court of appeals held that the attorney general’s office (who 
litigates the implied consent hearings) and the city attorneys (who 
prosecute the DWI) were in privity with each other.100  The court 
held that, if notice of the implied consent hearing was given to the 
prosecuting attorney, the state would be estopped from relitigating 
any matter that was decided against it at that hearing.101  Because 
issues surrounding probable cause were often litigated at implied 
consent hearings, the application of collateral estoppel would have 
resulted in the dismissal of criminal cases where there had been a 
finding of lack of probable cause at the companion implied 
consent hearing.  However, in 2002, the Minnesota legislature 
legislatively overruled the court of appeals and added a clause to 
the implied consent statute stating that “[t]he civil hearing . . . shall 
not give rise to an estoppel on any issues arising from the same set 
of circumstances in any criminal prosecution.”102 
III. FEDERAL PRE-HEARING REVOCATION DECISIONS 
While implied consent revocations are widely used and serve 
valid purposes, the revocation of a driver’s license without the 
benefit of a judicial hearing raises procedural due process 
 
 96. State v. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 97. Id. at 660. 
 98. Id. at 662. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. at 661–62. 
 101. Id. at 664.  Because of the difference in evidentiary rules and the burden 
of proof, a criminal defendant is not collaterally estopped from challenging the 
issue determined in the implied consent hearing at the subsequent criminal trial.  
Id. at 662 n.1. 
 102. MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subd. 3(g) (2004). 
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concerns.  Accordingly, pre-hearing revocation schemes have been 
challenged on both a federal and state level.  The federal decisions 
establish the minimum level of procedural due process that must 
be afforded drivers under the United States Constitution.  Each 
state must afford at least that much protection, but may offer 
greater protection under the law or constitution of the individual 
state. 
A. Bell v. Burson103 
In 1971, the Supreme Court considered a Georgia pre-hearing 
suspension scheme involving the suspension of driver’s licenses for 
uninsured motorists involved in motor vehicle accidents.104  Such 
drivers would have their licenses suspended unless they posted 
“security to cover the amount of damages claimed by aggrieved 
parties in reports of the accident.”105 
While the Court recognized that a driver’s license is a 
privilege, the Court stated that 
[o]nce licenses are issued . . . their continued possession 
may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.  
Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action 
that adjudicates important interests of licensees.  In such 
cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that 
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.106 
The Court also stated that “[a] procedural rule that may satisfy 
due process in one context may not necessarily satisfy procedural 
due process in every case.”107  Accordingly, the Bell court held that 
[w]hile ‘many controversies have raged about [sic] the 
Due Process Clause,’ . . . it is fundamental that except in 
emergency situations (and this is not one) due process 
requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest 
such as that here involved, it must afford ‘notice and 
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the 
case’ before the termination becomes effective.108 
The Supreme Court concluded that Georgia could not revoke 
 
 103. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
 104. Id. at 536. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 539. 
 107. Id. at 540. 
 108. Id. at 542 (internal citations omitted). 
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licenses of uninsured drivers involved in motor vehicle accidents 
without first having a hearing to determine if “there [was] a 
reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him as 
a result of the accident.”109 
B. Mackey v. Montrym110 
The Supreme Court considered Massachusetts’ implied 
consent pre-hearing revocation scheme in 1978.111  Drivers who 
refused to take an alcohol concentration test had their licenses 
revoked for ninety days.112  A driver whose license was revoked 
could obtain an immediate hearing before the Registrar, who was 
responsible for implementing the revocations.113  This hearing 
included all issues relevant to the basis of the revocation.114 
When evaluating this pre-hearing revocation scheme, the 
Court used the due process balancing test laid out in Mathews v. 
Eldridge.115  The test requires the balancing of three factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.116 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. 443 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. at 4. 
 113. Id. at 7. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 10.  Mathews v. Eldridge is the seminal procedural due process case 
laying out the balancing test used to determine if the requirement of procedural 
due process has been met.  The issue is Mathews was “whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to the termination of Social 
Security disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for 
an evidentiary hearing.”  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976).  Mathews 
specifically states that “some form of hearing is required before an individual is 
finally deprived of a property interest,” and holds that “[t]he fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner.’”  Id. at 333 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 
545, 552 (1965)).  Mathews also recognizes that “‘[d]ue process is flexible and calls 
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands’”  Id. (quoting 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
 116. Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). 
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The Court recognized that the private interest in a driver’s 
license was substantial because a driver cannot be made “whole for 
any personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered by 
reason of any delay in redressing an erroneous suspension through 
postsuspension [sic] review procedures.”117  However, the Court 
noted that the private interest was satisfied because the driver could 
request an immediate hearing.118 
When considering the risk of erroneous deprivation, the 
Montrym court held “the Due Process Clause has never been 
construed to require that the procedures used to guard against an 
erroneous deprivation of a protectible ‘property’ or ‘liberty’ 
interest be so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of 
error.”119  In this case, the possibility of an error could be quickly 
corrected because of the availability of an immediate hearing.120 
The state’s interest was the preservation of safety on the public 
highways.121  The majority found a pre-hearing revocation scheme 
serves this interest in three ways.122  First, it serves as a sanction.123  
Second, it encourages drivers to take the alcohol content test.124  
Finally, drunken drivers are promptly removed from the roads.125 
After balancing these factors, the Court held that the pre-
hearing revocation scheme satisfied the requirements of 
procedural due process.126  This decision was largely predicated on 
the availability of an immediate hearing before the Registrar.127 
C. Barry v. Barchi128 
 The Supreme Court decided another pre-hearing suspension 
case on the very same day as Montrym.  While Montrym was a sharply 
divided five-to-four decision, the Court unanimously agreed in 
Barchi that a New York horse trainer’s license suspension law was 
unconstitutional solely because it permitted pre-hearing suspension 
 
 117. Id. at 11 (citing Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977)). 
 118. Id. at 12. 
 119. Id. at 13. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 17. 
 122. Id. at 18. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 19. 
 127. Id. at 18–19. 
 128. 433 U.S. 55 (1979). 
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of a trainer’s license without prompt post-suspension review.129 
 In Barchi, the Court reviewed a law that allowed for the 
immediate suspension of a horse trainer’s license if a horse from 
her stable was found to have been drugged at the time of a race.130  
The law created a rebuttable presumption that the trainer was 
involved in the drugging or at least negligent in not preventing it.131  
The law provided for a hearing on the suspension, but did not 
permit the suspension to be stayed pending the hearing or provide 
for when the hearing must be held.132  It also permitted the hearing 
board thirty days after the hearing to render its decision.133 
 The Court applied the Mathews due process test and found 
that the state had a compelling government interest in “assuring 
the integrity of the racing carried out under its auspices.”134  The 
Court also recognized the “substantial interest” a trainer has in 
avoiding a suspension.135  Finally, the Court determined that even 
though the risk of erroneous deprivation in the procedures used to 
test the horse was “not beyond error,” they were “sufficiently 
reliable to satisfy constitutional requirements.”136  Following this 
analysis, the Court held that the State was entitled to impose the 
pre-hearing suspension.137 
However, the Court struck down the law because it provided 
no mechanism to ensure that a hearing would be held “at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”138  The Court noted 
that the law “neither on its face nor as applied in this case, assured 
a prompt disposition of the outstanding issues between Barchi and 
the State.”139  Particularly troubling to the Court was the fact that it 
was as “likely as not that Barchi and others subject to relatively brief 
suspensions would have no opportunity to put the State to its proof 
until they have suffered the full penalty imposed.”140  The Court 
held that, despite the State’s compelling interest in securing a pre-
 
 129. Id. at 68. 
 130. Id. at 59. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 60. 
 134. Id. at 64. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id at 65. 
 137. Id. at 66. 
 138. Id. (citing Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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hearing suspension, “once suspension has been imposed, the 
trainer’s interest in a speedy resolution becomes paramount.”141 
 
IV. MINNESOTA PRE-HEARING REVOCATION 
 
A. Pre-Hearing Revocation and Heddan v. Dirkswager142 
 
Prior to 1982, Minnesota had a post-hearing revocation 
scheme.143  The arresting officer issued a notice and order of 
proposed revocation, and the driver received a thirty-day temporary 
license.144  The driver then had thirty days to request a judicial 
hearing.145  If the driver requested a judicial hearing, the revocation 
was stayed until the court ruled against the driver.146  If the driver 
did not petition for judicial review, the revocation period began at 
the end of the thirty-day period.147  “This system resulted in 
approximately one request for judicial review out of every three 
implied consent violations reported.”148  In 1981, there were 
“10,500 requests for judicial review.”149  Only 326 of these “drivers 
were able to avoid license revocation.”150 
In 1982, the Minnesota legislature made substantial changes to 
the implied consent laws.151  These changes were aimed at reducing 
“the time lapse between an implied consent violation and the 
imposition of license revocation.”152  To this end, a pre-hearing 
license revocation scheme was enacted.153  In addition, the thirty-
day temporary license was replaced with a seven-day temporary 
license.154  The driver still had thirty days to petition for judicial 
review.155  After the driver petitioned for judicial review, a hearing 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. 336 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1983), superseded by statute on other grounds, as 
discussed in Hamilton v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 600 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999). 
 143. MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 5a (1980) (repealed 2000). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn. 1983). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. MINN. STAT. § 169.123 (1982) (repealed 2000); see also Heddan, 336 
N.W.2d at 57. 
 152. Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 57. 
 153. MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 4  (2004); Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 57. 
 154. Id. § 169.123, subd. 5a(c)(1); Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 57. 
 155. Id. § 169.123, subd. 5(c)(a); Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 58. 
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss4/5
SHERIDANBURKHART BOOTH.DOC 4/17/2005  2:27:10 PM 
2005] REVOKE FIRST, ASK QUESTIONS LATER 1477 
had to be held at the earliest practicable date, and in no event later 
than sixty days after the filing of the petition.156  However, the 
revocation was no longer stayed while the judicial review was 
pending.157 
Minnesota’s original pre-hearing revocation scheme was 
challenged in Heddan v. Dirkswager.158  Heddan involved a 
consolidated appeal of three drivers who had unsuccessfully 
challenged their license revocations and the constitutionality of the 
new implied consent law in a declaratory judgment action.159 
The supreme court upheld the revocations and held that the 
pre-hearing revocation scheme did not violate due process.160  In 
reaching this determination, the court recognized that “[a] license 
to drive is an important property interest”161 and “that some form of 
hearing [was] required before an individual is finally deprived of a 
property interest.”162  The court stated “[t]he fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’ . . . .  ‘Due process is 
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands.’”163 
The court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s review 
of Massachusetts’s implied consent law in Mackey v. Montrym164 and 
applied the Mathews165 due process balancing test, weighing three 
factors: 1) the private interest affected; 2) the risk of erroneous 
deprivation through the procedures used and the probable value of 
substitute procedural safeguards; and 3) the government’s interest, 
including the function involved and the administrative burdens of 
additional or substituted procedural requirements.166 
When evaluating the weight to be accorded to the private 
interest, the court considered 1) the duration of the revocation; 2) 
the availability of hardship relief; and 3) the availability of prompt 
 
 156. Id. § 169.123, subd. 6; Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 58. 
 157. Id. § 169.123, subd. 5c(c); Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 57. 
 158. See Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 55.  Heddan involved the consolidation of three 
plaintiffs: Milo Heddan, Paul Lundberg, and Craig Miller.  Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 63. 
 161. Id. at 58 (citing Bell, 402 U.S. at 539). 
 162. Id. at 59 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557–58 (1974)). 
 163. Id. at 59 (citations omitted). 
 164. See infra part III.B. 
 165. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see note 115. 
 166. Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 59. 
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post-revocation review.167  The supreme court held that, while the 
risk of erroneous deprivation was higher under Minnesota law than 
the Massachusetts scheme, due to its ability to revoke for test 
failures, rather than just refusals, this risk was not so heightened as 
to destroy the balance of the test.168  The court also held that the 
public and governmental interests were served through the pre-
hearing suspension scheme.169  According to the court, the pre-
hearing suspension scheme provided a means to deter motorists 
from driving under the influence, allowed for the swift removal of 
impaired drivers from the road and diminished the likelihood that 
motorists will seek a hearing, thereby conserving judicial 
resources.170  Finally, the court held that the individual’s interest 
was adequately protected in three ways.171  First, the revocation 
period had a relatively short duration.172  Second, there was the 
immediate availability of hardship relief.173  Finally, the individual 
could take advantage of prompt post-revocation relief.174 
B. Statutory Revisions and Davis v. Commissioner of Public Safety175 
In 1992, the legislature amended the implied consent law.  
Under the new statute, a first time offender whose license was 
revoked under the implied consent statute had to wait fifteen days 
for a limited license (work permit).176  If the driver had a prior 
revocation and failed the test, the waiting period for a limited 
license (work permit) was ninety days.177  A driver with a prior 
revocation who refused to take the test had a waiting period of 180 
days.178 
The 1992 revisions survived a constitutional challenge in 1994 
 
 167. Id. at 63. 
 168. Id. at 62. 
 169. Id. at 63. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 60. 
 172. Id.  The revocation period was six months for test refusal and ninety days 
for test failure.  Id. 
 173. Id.  Every individual received a seven-day temporary license and was 
immediately eligible for a limited license (work permit).  Id. 
 174. Id.  A hearing must be “conducted at the earliest practicable date, and in 
any event no later than sixty (60) days following the filing of petition for review.”  
Id.  The decision from the hearing had to be filed within fifteen days.  Id. 
 175. 517 N.W.2d 901 (1994). 
 176. See MINN. STAT. § 171.30, subd. 2(a)(1992). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
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in Davis v. Commissioner of Public Safety.179  The Davis court noted 
that despite the fact that “limited” or hardship licenses were no 
longer immediately available, it was not “prepared at this time to 
conclude that the legislation in question violates either federal or 
state due process guarantees.”180  The supreme court noted, 
however, that it was “troubled by the lack of immediate hardship 
relief for first time offenders.”181  When issuing its decision, the 
Davis court echoed the Supreme Court’s concern about the pre-
hearing revocation scheme, stating that “a court cannot undo an 
erroneous revocation,” because in such a case “full retroactive relief 
cannot be provided by a court,” and “even a day’s loss of a driver’s 
license can inflict grave injury upon a person.”182 
C. Further Statutory Revisions 
In 1998, the Minnesota Legislature further revised the implied 
consent statute.  Prior to 1998, having an alcohol-related revocation 
on a driver’s record carried some negative impact.  However, under 
the 1998 revisions, implied consent revocations are treated as the 
functional equivalent of a criminal conviction for every purpose 
under the impaired driving code.  Where the statute previously 
referred to “prior convictions” for purposes of penalty 
enhancement and collateral consequences, the statute now refers 
to “prior qualified impaired-driving incidents.”183  That term is 
defined to include not only convictions but also “prior impaired-
driving related losses of license.”184 
The most recent statutory changes were enacted during the 
2003 Special Session.185  In that amendment, the legislature deleted 
the speedy hearing requirement.  The sentence “[t]he hearing 
must be held at the earliest practicable date, and in any event no 
later than sixty (60) days following the filing of the petition for 
review” was removed from section 169A.53, subdivision 3(a).186  In 
 
 179. 517 N.W.2d 901 (1994). 
 180. Id. at 905.  The court also addressed the constitutionality of the implied 
consent advisory.  Id. at 904.  “While [the court was] troubled by the deficiencies 
of the current advisory, [they were] unwilling at this time to say that the advisory 
violates procedural due process under the Minnesota Constitution.”  Id. 
 181. Id. at 905. 
 182. Id. (quoting Montrym, 443 U.S. at 11, 21, 30 (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
 183. MINN. STAT. § 169A.03, subd. 22 (2004). 
 184. Id. §169A.03, subds. 21–22. 
 185. See id. § 169A.53, subd. 3. 
 186. Id. § 169A.53, subd. 3(a). 
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addition, the requirement that an order be entered within fourteen 
days after the implied consent hearing was removed.187 
 
V. THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE: FEDZIUK V. 
COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY188 
A. Facts 
 
Patricia Fedziuk has been prescribed the drug Adderall, a 
medication commonly used to treat depression and attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder.189  Adderall contains amphetamine 
and is a Schedule II controlled substance.190 
On October 23, 2003, Ms. Fedziuk was pulled over on the 
suspicion of drunk driving.  After performing a series of field 
sobriety tests, the peace officer administered a preliminary breath 
test.  This test indicated that there was no alcohol in Ms. Fedziuk’s 
breath.  Despite this fact, Ms. Fedziuk was arrested and taken to the 
police station.  At the police station, Ms. Fedziuk consented to a 
blood test.  The blood test later revealed the presence of 
amphetamine.  Based on this finding, the commissioner of public 
safety issued a notice and order of revocation for ninety days, 
beginning April 3, 2004.191 
Ms. Fedziuk’s attorney requested an administrative and judicial 
review of the revocation.192  This request included a copy of a letter 
from Ms. Fedziuk’s doctor, stating that Ms. Fedziuk had been 
prescribed a medication containing amphetamine.193  The request 
for administrative rescission of the revocation was denied.194  Ms. 
Fedzuik then filed a separate action for declaratory judgment to 
have Minnesota’s pre-hearing revocation scheme declared 
unconstitutional.195  Ms. Fedziuk also petitioned for judicial review, 
 
 187. Id. § 169A.54, subd. 3(c).  The deleted sentence read “[t]he court shall 
file its order within fourteen (14) days following the hearing.”  Id. 
 188. Fedziuk v. Commissioner of Public Safety is currently being considered by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.  Oral arguments were heard on March 7, 2005. 
 189. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment, 
Order Certifying Question to Court of Appeals and Judgment at 2, Fedziuk v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, Dakota County Dist. Court, No. C6-04-7458 (Minn. Nov. 
22, 2004) [hereinafter AMENDED ORDER]. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 1. 
 192. Id. at 2. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
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which was scheduled for hearing on June 1, 2004.196  On May 27, 
2004, the commissioner of public safety decided to rescind Ms. 
Fedziuk’s revocation.197  However, Ms. Fedziuk’s driver’s license was 
listed as “restricted” until June 11, 2004.198  Ms. Fedziuk’s driver’s 
license was revoked for a total of sixty-nine days.199 
 
B. The Argument for Declaring Pre-Hearing Revocations 
Unconstitutional 
 
1. Non-Emergency Situation 
 
While Bell v. Burson200 is most often cited for the proposition 
that a driver’s license is an important interest entitled to 
constitutional due process protection, the Supreme Court also 
stated that “except in emergency situations . . . due process requires 
that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here 
involved, it must afford ‘notice and opportunity for hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case’ before the termination 
becomes effective.”201 
Emergency situations have been generally defined as situations 
where “swift action is necessary to protect public health, safety, 
revenue, or the integrity of public institutions.”202  According to the 
Supreme Court, an emergency situation existed when mislabeled 
drugs were being sold to the public.203  This emergency justified a 
pre-hearing seizure of drugs from store shelves.204  The immediate 
seizure and destruction of diseased poultry was justified as an 
emergency because it was necessary to prevent the diseased meat 
from entering the food chain.205  Finally, the Supreme Court found 
that an emergency justified the imposition of a federally appointed 
conservator without the need for a prior hearing in the case of 
financial abuses by bank management.206 
 
 196. Id. at 3. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
 201. Id. at 542 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). 
 202. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 22 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 203. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 601 (1950). 
 204. Id. 
 205. N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 320–21 (1908). 
 206. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 252–54 (1947). 
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The immediate revocation of a driver’s license for testing over 
the legal limit or refusing to test is not such an emergency.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court conceded that the immediate revocation was 
not imposed as an emergency measure, but rather as a sanction to 
induce drivers to submit to testing.207  It would have been difficult 
to find otherwise, as Massachusetts did not revoke a license at all if 
the driver submitted to the test and failed.  Accordingly, drivers 
who were demonstrably drunk were not subject to a pre-hearing 
revocation.  The inebriated driver would be permitted to continue 
driving and endangering the public, while the safe—but 
uncooperative—driver would be banned. 
Minnesota’s system also demonstrates the non-emergency 
status of the pre-hearing revocation scheme.  In Minnesota, all 
drivers, whether they refuse to test or test more than twice the legal 
limit, are given a seven-day temporary license before the revocation 
goes into effect.208  Since a driver poses the greatest threat to public 
safety at or near the time the person is demonstrably impaired, it is 
illogical to argue that permitting the person to drive for seven 
additional days is designed to protect the public from an 
“emergency.” 
 
2. Changes in the Private Interest 
 
a. Availability of Prompt Post-Revocation Review 
 
During the May 2003 Special Session, the legislature took its 
latest swipe at the implied consent statute and removed the 
provision requiring “prompt judicial review.”  District courts are no 
longer required to hold the implied consent hearings within sixty 
days of the filing for a petition for review.209  In addition, district 
courts are no longer required to file their orders within fourteen 
days following the hearing.210 
b. Other Factors Not Present at the Time of Heddan and Davis 
Another factor that weighs heavily in this analysis is the fact 
that the significance of the implied consent blemish has increased 
 
 207. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 20 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 208. MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subd. 7 (2004). 
 209. Id.  § 169A.53, subd. 3(a). 
210. Id. 
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astronomically since both Heddan and Davis were decided.  In 1983 
and 1992, an alcohol-related revocation on a driver’s record had a 
negative impact.  But despite the societal stigma, it was nothing 
more than a temporarily forfeited property interest.  However, due 
to 1998 statutory amendments, an implied consent revocation is 
now considered the functional equivalent of a criminal conviction 
for every purpose under the impaired driving code.211  A prior 
implied consent revocation can now be used to enhance the level 
of a subsequent criminal offense from a misdemeanor to a gross 
misdemeanor—or even a felony.212  This is true even if the driver 
was acquitted of the criminal offense that gave rise to the 
revocation.213  Under Minnesota’s current scheme, if a person had 
his or her license revoked on three prior occasions within the 
previous ten years, but had never been convicted, that person 
would be subject to a felony prosecution, just as though they had 
been convicted.  In addition, prior revocations alone (without 
companion convictions) are used as a basis for applying mandatory 
minimum criminal penalties,214 for revoking the license plates on 
every vehicle owned individually or jointly,215 and as a basis for 
forfeiting a person’s motor vehicle to the police.216 
3. Changes in the Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 
The risk of erroneous deprivation element has shifted the 
Mathews balance toward a need for greater due process protections 
for the driver.  Although today’s breath testing instruments are as 
reliable as those used in the early 1980s, the interests at stake were 
substantially lower at that time. 
Another change since Heddan is the availability of affirmative 
defenses.217  The impaired driving code has added at least three 
affirmative defenses.  First, it is an affirmative defense that the test 
failure was the result of “post-driving consumption.”218  Second, test 
failure because of the use of prescription drugs is an affirmative 
 
211. See infra part IV.C. 
212.  MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subd. 3(a) (2004). 
213. Id. 
214. Id. §§ 169A.275, .276. 
215. Id. § 169A.60. 
216. Id. § 169A.63 
 217. See id. §§ 169A.53, subd. 3(c), 169A.46, subds. 1,2. 
 218. Id. §§ 169A.53, subd. 3(c), 169A.46, subd. 1. 
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defense.219  Finally, there is an affirmative defense available for 
“reasonable refusal.”220  Although the statute recognizes these 
defenses, the State acts in spite of them.  For example, it is the 
practice of the Department of Public Safety to revoke all drivers’ 
licenses who test positive for a Schedule I or Schedule II controlled 
substance without inquiring whether the person had a prescription 
for the drug involved.221  Drivers who have these defenses available 
will always suffer an erroneous revocation that will remain in effect 
until the driver obtains a judicial hearing on the merits.  Because 
the requirement that the hearing take place swiftly has been 
removed from the statute, it is unlikely that a driver who has one of 
these defenses will have an opportunity to present it until they have 
suffered their full revocation. 
4. Changes in the State’s Interest Since Heddan 
The public and governmental interest has remained the same 
since Heddan.  Drunk drivers posed a severe threat to the health 
and safety of the public in 1983 and continue to do so. 
In Heddan, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that approximately 
33,000 licenses were revoked under the implied consent law in 1981.222  
According to Department of Public Safety statistics, that number was 
32,800 in 1999, 33,329 in 2000, 32,074 in 2001, 31,911 in 2002, and 
30,991 in 2003.223  These numbers indicate that the state’s interest in 
promoting public safety has remained basically the same under both the 
1981 post-hearing revocation scheme and the current pre-hearing 
revocation scheme. 
C. The District Court Decision 
In addition to requesting administrative and judicial review, 
Ms. Fedziuk brought a separate action for “declaratory judgment to 
declare Minnesota’s pre-hearing implied consent revocation 
scheme unconstitutional.”224  On November 22, 2004, the district 
court entered its Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
 
 219. Id. § 169A.46, subd. 2. 
 220. Id. § 169A.53, subd. 3(c). 
 221. Id. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7). 
 222. Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 57. 
 223. Minnesota Department of Public Safety, IMPAIRED DRIVING INCIDENTS ON 
RECORD 14 (2003), at www.dps.state.mn.us/OTS/crashdata/ 2003%20Impaired% 
20Facts/IDF03GIncidentVer10.pdf (last visited on April 14, 2005). 
 224. AMENDED ORDER, supra note 189, at 2. 
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Order for Judgment, and Order Certifying Question to Court of 
Appeals & Judgment.  The Order declares the scheme 
unconstitutional; however, it allowed the state to enforce the 
statute pending the appellate court’s decision.225  The Order 
certified two questions to the Minnesota Court of Appeals as 
important and doubtful: 
A. Does Minnesota’s implied consent scheme of pre-
hearing revocation offend a driver’s state and/or federal 
constitutional guarantees of due process of law? 
B. Is the 1980 version of the implied consent law revived 
by the declaration that the current implied consent law is 
unconstitutional?  If not, what version, if any, is revived if 
the current law is struck down?226 
The district court judge attached a memorandum, outlining 
the district court’s reasoning.227  The Order lays out the numerous 
statutory revisions since the supreme court considered the pre-
hearing revocation scheme in Heddan.228  The Order next applies 
the Mathews due process balancing test and weighs the three factors 
relevant to the private interest: 1) the duration of the revocation; 
2) the availability of hardship relief; and 3) the availability of 
prompt post-revocation review.229 
The Order states that “revocation periods have risen 
dramatically since Heddan.”230  In 1982, when Heddan was decided, a 
driver’s license “would be revoked for a period of ninety (90) days 
if the driver tested at 0.10 or more.”231  If the driver refused to take 
 
 225. Id. at 4–5. 
 226. Id.  The commissioner of public safety filed a motion for expedited 
review.  The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently took the case from the court 
of appeals before the latter court heard oral arguments in the matter.  Oral 
arguments were heard at the Supreme Court on March 7, 2005. 
 227. See id. at 8–15.  The memorandum first addresses the issues of standing 
and mootness.  Id. at 7.  The district court concluded that the issue was not moot 
because it was “capable of repetition but will inevitably escape review.”  Id. (citing 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).  The court also found that Ms. Fedzuik had 
standing even though she had not exhausted other remedies available to her at 
law because exhaustion of these remedies is not required under Minnesota’s 
declaratory judgment statute.  Id. at 8; see MINN. STAT. § 555.01 (2004).  The district 
court did not address whether there was an emergency situation that justified pre-
hearing revocations. 
 228. AMENDED ORDER, supra note 189, at 8–11; see discussion supra part IV. 
 229. AMENDED ORDER, supra note 189, at 8. 
 230. Id. at 12. 
 231. Id. 
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the test, the revocation was 180 days.232  Today, the revocation 
period for test refusal is one year, double the revocation period of 
1982.233  First time offenders who are under twenty-one years old 
will have their licenses revoked for six months.234  A driver with a 
prior revocation within ten years who tests over 0.10 is subject to a 
180-day revocation.235  The only drivers who receive a ninety-day 
revocation are first time offenders who test over 0.10 and are older 
than twenty-one.236  If the driver tests at 0.20 or more, all the 
revocation periods double.237 
The most recent statutory change was the removal of the 
requirement of “prompt judicial review.”238  The district court 
found that 
[t]he specific language deleted by the 2003 legislature was 
the basis for the Heddan court’s holding that the Mackey v. 
Montrym “prompt post-revocation review” element had 
been met.  The elimination of this critical due process 
component, in combination with the elimination of 
immediate hardship relief, has eviscerated the heart of the 
due process protections found to save the prehearing 
revocation scheme in Heddan.239 
Finally, the court discussed the change in the availability of 
hardship relief.240  The district court noted that, in 1982, “a driver 
was immediately eligible for ‘hardship relief’ in the form of a 
limited license (work permit).”241  The 1992 amendments delayed 
this availability for fifteen days for first time offenders.242  A driver 
with a prior offense now has to wait ninety days for a work permit.243  
A driver with a prior offense who refuses to take an implied consent 
test is not eligible for a work permit until 180 days after the 
revocation period.244  These amendments had been approved by 
 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 11. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
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the supreme court in Davis.245  However, the district court noted 
that the Davis court had trepidations about the trend of statutory 
amendments.246  The district court judge stated that “[a]lthough 
the [Davis] court ultimately upheld the statute, it sent a clear 
message to the legislature that it had pushed as far as the 
constitution would bear.”247 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The license revocations of Heddan’s day no longer resemble 
those of today.  The Minnesota legislature has dramatically revised 
the implied consent statute and removed the very protections that 
the Heddan court relied on for the statute’s constitutionality.  
Minnesota drivers no longer have the right to prompt review of 
their license revocations.  In addition, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation has increased because of the availability of affirmative 
defenses.  Finally, the private interests involved in a driver’s license 
revocation have increased dramatically because a license revocation 
can now be used to enhance criminal charges and penalties.  And 
yet, while the stakes associated with the revocation have 
dramatically increased, the due process protections afforded to 
drivers have steadily declined.  If the Minnesota legislature wants to 
increase the civil penalties of an implied consent revocation to be 
identical to a criminal conviction, the procedural due process 
protections afforded to drivers must be greater, not less, than the 
protections that were afforded when the stakes were lower.  The 
enhanced private interest is no longer adequately protected and 
clearly outweighs the public interest.  This enhanced private 
interest, combined with the removal of the provision providing 
prompt post-revocation review, tips the scales of Mathews and 
mandates greater procedural due process protection.  Fedzuik 
provides the Minnesota Supreme Court with the opportunity to act 
on their warnings to the legislature that continued erosion of the 
procedural due process provided to drivers in the implied consent 
arena will render the statute unconstitutional. 
 
 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
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